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THE ADOPTION TRILEMMA: THE ADULT
ADOPTEE'S EMERGING SEARCH FOR
HIS ANCESTRAL IDENTITY
Marshall A. Levint
In 1974, while presiding over Circuit Court Number 2 of
Baltimore City, a court having jurisdiction over domestic
relations cases, the author was struck by the searing
emotionalism often arising when adoptees' quests to learn
about their genealogical heritage were frustrated by Maryland's "sealed record" rule, which denies adoptees access to
the records of their adoption proceedings except upon an
order of court (which, in effect, means a showing of "good
cause"). In this Article, the author critically examines such
rules (and similar statutes) in light of the interests of the
parties to the adoption process. He recommends that these
restrictive rules and statutes be modified to grant access to
adoptees when they reach the age of majority.
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption process does not trace its roots to the English
common law,' but rather to statutory creation by the state. 2 Despite
this absence of a venerable Anglo-Saxon legal heritage, the
separation of child from birthparent 3 is a theme frequently woven
into literature, 4 religion, 5 and folklore.6 Adoption's attraction to
t B.A., 1941, University of Virginia; J.D., 1947, Harvard Law School; Associate
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2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

Judge, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City (8th Judicial Circuit).
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Paul S. Teitelbaum,
staff member, University of Baltimore Law Review.
Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 746
(1956). The English would not accept the fiction that bloodlines could be created
by legal process. "Now it is plain that as soon as we admit the doctrine of
artificial kindred - that is as soon as we allow the exercise of the law of
adoption - physical purity of race is at an end." Freeman, Race and Language
in 28 HARVARD CLASSICS 247 (1910).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §67 (1973).
The matter of nomenclature is of significance. "Birthparents" have been
variously called "biological parents" or "natural parents." When one uses
"biological parents" a question is raised as to whether adoptees are made of
plastic. When one says "natural parents" there is an implication that adoptees
are unnatural. See M. BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION 9 (1976).
The Shakespearian adoptive mother put it poignantly:
I say, I am your mother;
And put you in the catalogue of those
That are enwombed mine; tis often seen
Adoption strives with nature and choice breeds
A native slip to us from foreign seeds;
You ne'er oppressed me with a mother's groan,
Yet I express to you a mother's care.
The Countess of Rousillon, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, I, iii, 150-56.
Moses, hidden on the edge of a river by his mother in order to escape death at the
hands of the Pharaoh's soldiers, was found and adopted by one of the Pharaoh's
daughters and was raised as an Egyptian. Exodus 2:1-11.
There is a legend that Romulus and Remus, storied founders of Rome, were
abandoned soon after birth and raised by a she-wolf. T. FRANK, A HISTORY OF
ROME, 21-22 (1925).
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those who chronicle the human condition lies in the often poignant
and growing interaction it engenders among the parties involved birthparents, adoptive parents, and adoptee. Guided in part by a
desire to avoid possible disruptive interchanges among these parties,
most American jurisdictions have enacted "sealed records" statutes
and rules 7 prohibiting the disclosure of the identity of the adoptee's
birthparents except upon the showing of "good cause."' 8 Increasingly, however, such prohibitions have come under criticism from
sociologists, psychiatrists and physicians 9 as not promoting the
welfare of the adoptee, as well as from members of the legal
profession who question their constitutionality. 10 Additionally,
adoptees, who are becoming more vocal in asserting their "right to
know," have joined together in groups to promote their common
interest in abolishing sealed record statutes." In growing numbers,
courts throughout the country have fashioned practical remedies in
response to proliferating litigation.
The tripartite nature of the adoption process is delineated in
Article 16, Section 67(a) of the Maryland Annotated Code. It states,
in pertinent part, that,
The General Assembly hereby declares its conviction that
the policies and procedures for adoption are socially
necessary and desirable, having as their purpose the
threefold protection of (1) the adoptive child, from unnecessary separation from his natural parents and from adoption
by persons unfit to have such responsibility; and (2) the
natural parents, from hurried and abrupt decisions to give
up the child; and (3) the adopting parents, by providing
them information about the child and his background, and

7. State sealed record statutes are collected in Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know
His NaturalHeritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 137-38 n.5 (1973). State statutes allowing
more liberal access to documents containing the identity of an adoptee's
birthparents are collected in Sealed Records In Adoptions: The Need for
Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAw. 211, 213-14 nn. 17-22 (1975).Other nations
have liberal access provisions. See, e.g., Children's Act, 1975, c. 72, § 26 (allowing
English and Welsh adoptees upon reaching the age of eighteen to apply to the
Registrar-General in order to obtain a certified copy of their record of birth);
Adoption of Children Act 1930, 20 and 21 Geo. 5, c. 37, § 11 (permitting Scottish
adoptees to obtain a copy of the original entry relating to their birth upon
reaching the age of seventeen); Adoption of Children Law of 1960, 14 Laws of
Israel 93, No. 45 (permitting open inspection of adoption records after an adoptee
has reached the age of eighteen).
8. See, e.g., In re Wells, 281 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1960); In re Minicozzi, 51 Misc. 2d 595,
273 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1966).
9. See text accompanying notes 17-38 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 56-104 infra.
11. The leading group is Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association (ALMA) in New
York. It was founded by Florence Fisher, a crusading adoptee and author of THE
SEARCH FOR ANNA FIsHER (1973). Adoptees in Search (AIS), another organization primarily devoted to the "search," is located in Bethesda, Maryland.
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protecting them from subsequent disturbance12 of their
relationships with the child by natural parents.
The legislative interest in severing cleanly the ties between
birthparents and their children and in vesting adoptive parents with
the full range of rights and obligations that exist in the parent-child
relationship is evidenced in Article 16, Section 78:
From and after the entry of . . . a final decree of
adoption . . ., the following legal effects shall result:
(a) . . . the person adopted shall be, to all intents and
purposes, the child of the petitioner ... and ... the person

adopted shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges and
subject to all the obligations of a child born in lawful
wedlock ...
(b) The natural parents of the person adopted, if living,
shall, after the interlocutory decree, be relieved of all legal
duties and obligations due from them to the person adopted,
and shall be divested of all rights with respect to such
person .... 13
Rule D81(a) of the Maryland Rules seeks to effectuate the intent of
Section 68 by sealing the record of adoption proceedings except on
order of the court. 14 Thus Maryland law deprives the adoptee of
knowledge of the identity of his biological heritage, unless he15 can
persuade a court to order the release of his adoption records.
This Article will explore the question of whether such a policy is
consonant with the view that the adult adoptee's welfare is of
paramount importance. 16 Additionally, it will discuss the judicial
treatment accorded charges that "sealed record" statutes are
unconstitutional. Finally examined will be the nature of the showing
an adult adoptee must make in order to persuade a court to grant
him access to the record of the adoption proceedings containing the
identity of his birthparents.
II. THE TRIALS OF PARTIES INVOLVED IN ADOPTION AND
THEIR CONFLICTING INTERESTS
A.

The Adoptee's Interest in Determining His Biological Origin
The wellspring of the attack on sealed record statutes lies in the
growing recognition of pyschological impairment occasioned by the
12.
13.
14.
15.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67(a) (1973).

Id. at § 78 (emphasis supplied).
Id.
Searching adoptees are "almost universally female. Perhaps men think it weak
and unmanly to look for an unknown mother, but ... women, as bearers of the
next generation of children, are more intimately touched by pregnancy and birth
than men. They more easily identify and want contact with the mothers who
bore them." L. BURGESS, THE ART OF ADOPTION, 148 (1976).
16. Cecil Co. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Goodyear, 263 Md. 611, 284 A.2d 426 (1971).
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denial of access to information regarding birth origin. 17 By negative
implication Dr. James A. Gibb, Director of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry at the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Maryland,
states the case against legislatively-mandated denial of access: "The
adult adoptee should have the right to know his biological origin...
in terms of mental health it would be a step in the right direction."' 18
A statement by the Committee on Adoption of the American
Academy of Pediatrics 19 enumerated several respects in which
adopted children encounter more difficulty than children raised by
their birthparents. These include a larger measure of emotional
stress and difficulty in establishing a sense of identity. 20 The
Committee recommended that adoptive parents take the initiative
and discuss his ancestry with the child. 21 A 1974 report to the
National Commission and Adoption and Dependent Care of the
American Academy of Pediatrics 22 noted seven problems found to be
prevalent in the adoption process. 23 Five of the seven pertained
17. R. ISAAC, ADOPTING A CHILD TODAY 179 (1965); H. KIRK, SHARED FATE (1961);
M. KORNITZER, ADOPTION AND FAMILY LIFE (1968); A. MCWHINNIE, ADOPTED
CHILDREN - How THEY GROW UP (1967); R. MAY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF
92 (1967); J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS, THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED
PEOPLE 165 (1973); Cominos, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption Through
Knowledge, 16 SOCIAL WORK 73 (1971); Crown, Ingredients of a Therapeutic

Family in a Browndale Motel, INVOLVEMENTS 3, 4 (March - April 1974); Elone

and Schwartz, A Longitudinal Study of Emotional, Social and Academic
Functioning of Adopted Children, 48 CHILD WELFARE 72, 74-78 (1969); Jones,
The Sealed Adoption Record Controversy; Report of a Survey of Agency Policy,
Practice and Opinion 20 (1976); Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the

Promotionof Values in the Adoption of Children, 4 J. FAM. L. 7 (1964); Kiester,
Should We Unlock the Adoption Files? 52 TODAY'S HEALTH 54 (1974); Kilbanoff,
GenealogicalInformation in Adoption, 11 FAM. L. Q. 185, 195 (1977); Lilliston,
Social Workers Discuss Adoptees Plight,L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1974, § 4, at 12, col.
1, at 13, col. 1; Simon & Santuria, Adoption and Psychiatric Illness, 122 AM. J.
OF PSYCH. 858, 864 (1966); Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Effects of the Sealed
Record in Adoption, 133 J. OF PSYCH. 900 (1976); Wellisch, Children with
Genealogy - A Problem of Adoption, 13 MENTAL HEALTH 41 (1952); Note,
Natural v. Adoptive Parents:Divided Children and the Wisdom of Solomon, 57
IOWA L. REV. 171, 184 n.72 (1971) (may lead to lack of self-identity); address by
Florence Fisher, Third North American Conference on Adoptable Children (Apr.
20, 1972) (denial of information may result in severe learning difficulties); W.
Reynolds, Eisnetz, Chiappise and Walsh, Personality Factors Differentiating
Searching and Un-Searching Adoptees, a paper presented to the Amer. Psych.

Ass'n (Sept. 1976).
18. Letter to author from Dr. Gibbs dated July 28, 1978.
19. Identity Development In Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 948 (1971).
20. Id.

21. Id. at 949.
22. J. Davis, Report to the National Committee on Adoption and Dependent Care,
American Academy of Pediatrics, Henry Siedel, M.D. Chairman. Presented Oct.
23, 1974.
23.
1. Infants are given up for adoption by their mothers often under
conditions of great emotional stress.
2. Adoptees, as they grow up, have a compelling need to learn about
their natural identity irrespective of their feelings for, or their
relationship with, their adoptive parents.
3. Natural parents may never be able to resolve their feelings about the
child they relinquished for adoption.
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directly to the adoptee's unrequited need for origin information. Of
the five recommendations made in the report, four involved
according adoptees more liberal access to such information. 24 The
physician presenting the report stated,
The more I go into the subject, the more I
cannot erase biological heritage by a court
unless we are going to create two classes
to learn his true
adoptee has as much right
the naturally born child. 25

realize that one
decree and that
of citizens, the
identity as does

He favored providing
adoptees with origin information when they
26
reach majority.
An influential Scottish study 27 noted that a life crisis, such as
death of one or both adoptive parents, illness, separation, or divorce
frequently triggers the adoptee's quest for knowledge of the identity
of his birthparents. 28 The study observed that in regard to origin
inquiry, adoptees fall into two groups - one whose members seek to
meet their birthparents, and the other composed of persons who,
while desiring information regarding their ancestry, harbor no
interest in actually meeting their birthparents or in developing a

4.

5.
6.
7.
24.

Id. at
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Adoptive parents sometimes feel threatened or hurt when their
adoptive child pressed the search for his or her natural identity even
though all parents, be they natural or adoptive, do not "own" their
children, but rather have the role of guiding them into maturity and
independent citizenship.
Adoptees are made to feel inferior - like second-class citizens when they are denied access to their birth records.
The non-disclosure regulations deprive the adoptees of a natural
right as persons through a covenant made at a time when it was
impossible for them to give their own consent.
Social agencies and courts may be unduly restrictive and arbitrary
in rejecting adoptees' petitions for information.
3-4.
Support present efforts of [adult] adoptees ... to gain access to court
and agency records to learn their identity.
Inform adoption and social agencies and the courts that ... present
policies are unfair and unduly restrictive to the adoptee and should
be modified.
Advocate for a change in adoption laws to legalize opening of
records when the adoptee reaches maturity.
Support efforts of [birthparents] desiring to locate their children
after they have reached maturity.
Work with adoptive parents to provide a better understanding of
their role and allow them to accept that the identity search should in
no way reflect upon their role or relationship with their adopted
child.
4.
10.
7.

Id. at
25. Id. at
26. Id. at
27. J. TRISELIOTIS,
(1973).
28. Id. at 96.

IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS, THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE
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relationship with them. 29 The study revealed that the former group
displayed a number of negative characteristics, including a history
of an unhappy home life and a low measure of self-esteem. 3°
Members of this group generally were less satisfied with the outcome
of their search. 3 1 In contrast, those who merely sought information
regarding their ancestry were more frequently satisfied with the
outcome of their search. 32 Significantly, a fair amount of background
information had already been made available to these people, while
such information had been withheld or given only in a hostile way to
members of the less-satisfied group.33 The study concluded that
detailed information regarding ancestry should be made available to
adoptees. 34 Other important works demonstrate that diminution of
36
genealogical bewilderment 35 - and enhancement of genetic ego are legitimate human imperatives. Revelation of adoption can be a
transcendental trauma to an adoptee, and in growing numbers,
adoptees are determined to know their heritage. The need is in their
bone and marrow. As put by Erik Erikson, "these psychosocial and
psychohistorical
dimensions reach right down into intraphysic
' '37
experience.
Finally, in addition to the prophylactic function with regard to
emotional disturbances that disclosure of origin information may
serve, it has been noted that such information should be made
available in order to determine if the adoptee's biological family has
a history of hereditary
ailments to which the adoptee may be
38
peculiarly susceptible.
B. The Interests of Birthparents and Adoptive Parents
There is thus an increasing body of evidence that sealed record
statutes work at cross-purposes to the best interests of adoptees. An
assessment of the desirability vel non of such laws, however, may
not be made without considering the often competing interest in the
laws' continued existence possessed by the other parties to the
adoption triangle - the birthparents and the adoptive parents.
29. Id. at 118.
30. Id. at 108.
31. Id. at 141.

32. Id. at 139.
33. Id. at 160.
34. Id. at 166.
35. See Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37
BRIT. J. OF MED. PSYCH. 133 (1964).
36. Cominos, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption Through Knowledge, 16 SOCIAL
WORK 73 (1971).
37. Quoted in, M. BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION, 3 (1976).

U1. In the absence of knowledge of pathology among an adoptee's ancestors, severe
medical disorders can develop or go unnoticed for years. Of 1, 545 genetic
diseases, 692 have been shown to be hereditary. Basic medical information
received by the adoptive parents would promote early detection of diseases such
as cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, glaucoma and muscular dystrophy. Also,
mental disorders such as schizophrenia, manic depressive psychosis and
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1. Birthparents
Once possessed of the names of his birthparents, the adoptee in
many instances is able to locate them.3 9 Most adoptees are born out
of wedlock. 40 While society is becoming more tolerant of illegitimacy,
the birthparent may yet want to veil the birth in secrecy - a desire
that is facilitated by sealed record statutes. The sudden re-entry of
an adult child into such parents' lives could be traumatic. The
traditional view is that birthparents place the child for adoption
with an expectation of anonymity. Such an expectation would be
frustrated were ready access to their identity made available.
Subjecting birthparents who desire anonymity to upsetting and
undesired reunion, is, by itself, a consequence to be avoided if
possible. Additionally, however, the prospect of such joyless
reunions may have a further ramification. Courts have stressed the
state's interest in promoting the adoption process. 41 Abrogation of
the statutes, thereby divesting birthparents of a statutory guarantee
of anonymity, is a change that is said to portend wholesale
with a corresponding rise in
abandonment of the adoption process,
42
black market adoption operations.
The force of the arguments stated in favor of perpetuating sealed
record statutes in order to serve the interest of the birthparents and
promote the institution of adoption is vitiated by the fact that in a
significant number of cases birthparents are not averse to a reunion
with their children. Studies show that many birthmothers desire to
share with their children current information about themselves and
to receive reports concerning the welfare of their children, 43 and that
two out of three said that if their natural children were searching for
them they would desire a reunion. 44 One author observes,
sociopathy, while not strictly hereditary, do seem to "travel in families." Thus a
medical history of the adoptee's biological parents would help in early detection
of any of these problems. Cominos, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption Through
Knowledge, 16 SOCIAL WORK 73 (1971).

39. Joanne Small, M.S.W., Board Member of Adoptees In Search, Bethesda,
Maryland and member of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's
Model Adoption Legislation and Procedures Advisory Panel states that over 97%
of the adoptees who participate in A.I.S. Workshops are able to find their
birthparents.
40. One statistical study published in 1968 found that approximately 63% of children
eligible for adoption were illegitimate. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, Child Welfare Statistics and Supplement for the National Center for
Social Statistics and Rehabilitation Service (1968).
41. It has been held that there is "a valid state interest to balance conflicting rights
of privacy and to protect the integrity of the adoption process which is likely to
suffer if the assurances of secrecy are not present." ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon,
459 F. Supp. 912, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. Note, Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 149-50
(1973).
43. Pannor, Sorosky & Baran, Opening the Sealed Record in Adoption - The
Human Need for Continuity, 51 J. JEWISH COMMUNAL SERVICE 188 (1974).
44. Comment, Discovery Rights of the Adoptee - Privacy Rights of the Natural
Parent:A ConstitutionalDilemma; 4 U. SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 65, 76-77 (1975).
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Adoptees are particularly sensitive to the feeling their
birthparents may have about being found. They respect a
mother's wish to keep the past transgression a secret. They
are not looking for further rejection. They are cautious in
their approach and avoid disclosing their 45relationship to
members of their mother's current families.
Moreover, as professionals in the social work field have
observed, social work agencies perceive that even birthmothers who
relinquish their children for adoption have evidenced a changed
attitude towards privacy. Many times these mothers voice no
objection when informed by adoption caseworkers that there may be
a desire for reunion by their children when they become adults. In
fact, some ask the caseworker to put their photographs in the file;
some write letters to their children and ask that the letters be placed
in the file to be read upon the request of the children when they
become adults. Baltimore's Department of Social Services (which
has established a "Single Parent's Service") now has a policy
whereby relinquishing mothers are informed of the possibility of
later search. This policy is increasingly- becoming a standard
46
procedure in social agencies throughout the United States.
Additionally, in those cases involving involuntary termination
of the birthparents' parental rights, the presumption that the
47
birthparents would desire anonymity is not so readily drawn.
Advocates of free access hold that concerns about a black market in
babies are merely speculative. 48 This assertion is borne out by
statistics tending to show that adoption has not declined in those
states and countries where sealed record statutes do not exist, except
perhaps to the extent that adoption everywhere has diminished with
the advent of the legality of abortion and changed community views
about single parentage. 49 It has also been suggested that birthparents, in the absence of sealed record statutes, will have yet another

45. L. BURGESS, THE ART OF ADOPTION 150 (1976). Ms. Burgess is a professional
with twenty-three years of experience in social work, nineteen of them in the field
of adoption.
46. Personal communication from Judith A. Eveland, Program Chief of Adoption
Services, Dept. of Social Services of Baltimore City.
47. I am indebted to the authors of the Appellate Brief filed on appeal from ALMA
Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), Professor Cyril C. Means,
Jr. of the New York University Law School and Bertram E. Hirsch, Esq., for
these insights, as well as for their observation that the rationale does not apply
to adoption of children from ethnocultural groups (such as American Indian
tribes) the tenets of whose culture and family organization are opposed to such
concepts as termination of parental rights and sealed records.
48. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss at 117, ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
49. Note, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins,48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1196, 1213-14 (1975).
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legal remedy in the form of traditional tort law, should they suffer
from the importunities of over intrusive offspring.50
Adoptive Parents
Adoptive parents, as well as birthparents, have an interest in
perpetuating sealed record statutes at least during the minority of
the adopted child. A 1975 study 5i concluded that adoptive parents
fear that a liberalization of adoption laws, tending to promote
interaction between adoptees and birthparents, would result in the
alienation of the affections of the adoptee. 52 The study suggested,
however, that this anxiety represented a resurgence of feelings of
53
emptiness and the sense of inadequacy associated with infertility.
The concern of the adoptive parents is minimized by the finding that
most adoptees experienced a deeper sense of love and appreciation
for their adoptive parents as a result of the establishment of a
relationship with their genealogical forebears. 54 In fact, an enlightened and cooperative attitude on the part of adoptive parents in
assisting the adoptee to locate birthparents demonstrates confidence
and serves further to cement the adoptive parent-adoptee relationship, rather than to endanger it. It seems reasonable to believe,
furthermore, that as the bond between adoptee and his adoptive
parents is fused by the passage of time, the likelihood diminishes
adoptee
that the birthparents will pose a disruptive threat should the
55
be granted access to the records upon reaching majority.
2.

THE ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF

III.

SEALED RECORD STATUTES
A. First Amendment Considerations
Sealed record statutes have been attacked on a variety of
constitutional grounds, but thus far the courts have rebuffed each
challenge. 56 One constitutional infirmity alleged by adoptees seeking
to overturn the statutes is predicated upon the first amendment,
which has been held to protect the right to receive information, 57 as
50. Id. at 1217. Compare Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971) with Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity, an Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962
(1964).
51. Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Effects of the Sealed Record in Adoption, 133 AM.
J. OF PSYCH. 900 (1976).
52. Id. at 901.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 902.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD AND
CHILD, 17-20 (1973).

55. J.

A.

SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE

56. See text accompanying notes 104-130 infra.
57. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943).
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well as the right to convey it. Sealed record statutes, it is maintained,
abridge this first amendment right to receive information. One
commentator asserts that access to information is necessary in order
to ensure that the individual is able to participate intelligently in
social decision-making processes. 58 A more expansive reading of the
first amendment's protection of the right to receive information
views that guarantee as designed to promote, as well, the purely
personal development of the individual, divorced entirely from his
role in society. 59 Whether the right to receive information is viewed
as intended to promote the welfare of the adoptee as a discrete
individual or the welfare of society as a whole, adoptees claim their
right to develop to their full potential, which requires access to
information regarding birth origin, is "intrinsically fundamental."6
The nub of their first amendment claim lies in the close interrelationship between access to information and the development of a sense
of identity.61 This asserted interrelationship is expanded by
formulating another constitutuional argument - that the statutes
infringe upon the adoptee's right to privacy.
The right of privacy, not expressly articulated in the Constitution, but held to flow from the penumbra of certain of the
amendments constituting the Bill of Rights, 62 has been recognized
frequently by the Supreme Court.6 3 At first blush, it seems
anomalous to attack sealed record statutes as impermissibly
infringing upon the right of privacy, because their ostensible intent
is to insulate each of the parties from the unseemly importunities of
the others. 64 It is the case, however, that this penumbral right is
employed by opponents as well as proponents (such as birthparents)
of sealed record statutes in the following fashion. Access to
information is asserted to play a crucial role in personal development. 65 Few would not concede that, in turn, one's stage of personal
58. Note, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1196, 1204 (1975).
59. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
60. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss at 91, ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
61. Note, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins, 48 S.CAL.
L. REV. 1196, 1205 (1975).
62. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 893 (1978) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977)).
63. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (single person's privacy right
includes decision whether to use contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (first amendment protects private possession of obscene materials; Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law prohibiting use of contraceptives held
invalid intrusion on marital privacy); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(privacy right is reflected in the fourth and fifth amendments' protection against
illegal search and seizure).
64. Note, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins, 48 S.CAL.
L. REV. 1196, 1200 (1975) (citing Terzian v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 286,
294-95, 88 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (1970)).
65. Id. at 1205.
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development necessarily plays a role in decision-making. 66 The
Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy proscribes
governmental intrusion into an individual's decisions regarding
fundamental issues. 67 Thus, the right to privacy, defined in this
instance as the absence of governmental intrusion into fundamental
decision making, is infringed by statutes that deny access to
information pertinent to identity development and, consequently, to
fundamental decision-making. The rationale of Griswold v. ConnectiCut68 is apposite, because in that case it was held that a state
cannot constitutionally ban dissemination of information regarding
the use of contraceptives because such a ban would restrict the flow
of information upon which married couples base fundamental
decisions.
Alternatively stated, the nexus between sealed record statutes
and the right to privacy arises in the following fashion. To the
extent that knowledge of one's biological origin contributes to a
sense of self, sealed record statutes deprive the adoptee of information that facilitates identity formation. One's identity plays a role in
fundamental decision-making. The constitutional right to privacy
protects fundamental decision-making from governmental intrusion.
Because fundamental decision-making is intimately related to one's
identity, the adoptee perforce makes such decisions based upon a
sense of self truncated by legislatively mandated confidentiality. In
a process that builds upon itself, these decisions influence subsequent evolution of the sense of self, which in turn plays a role in any
further decision-making.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right. 69 Open access proponents maintain that legislation abridging fundamental rights must be narrowly drawn and
promote a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional

66. Justice Douglas stated the objectives of the constitutional right to privacy to be
"the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect,
interests, tastes, and personality" and "freedom of choice in the basic decisions
of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the
education and upbringing of children." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring). This statement by Douglas is consonant with the
asserted close connection between one's state of personal development and
fundamental decision making.
One commentator states that because "it is difficult even theoretically to
separate a person's identity from his choices in fundamental relationships ...
interference with its development necessarily affects his private decisions." Note,
The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1196, 1208 (1975).
67. Justice Stewart viewed the right to privacy to proscribe governmental intrusion
into "matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or
beget a child." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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muster. 70 The proponents agree that until the adoptee achieves the
age of majority, the state does have a compelling interest in
protecting the adoptive parent from his adopted child's return to the
birthparents and in preserving the birthparents' anonymity. 71 Once
the adoptee is past the age of majority, however, they maintain the
compelling interest wanes. 72 The thesis that the state's interest may
fluctuate over time was employed by the Court in Roe v. Wade, 73 in
which it held that the state's interest in a fetus becomes compelling
after the first trimester of pregnancy.7 4 Open access proponents
reaches majority
argue, by reverse analogy, that once the adoptee
75
the state's interest ceases to be compelling.
Adoptees view the penumbral right to privacy as closely
associated with the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due
process. They note the language employed by Justice Rehnquist in
Paul v. Davis76 characterizing the Court's right to privacy cases as

"defying categorical description, [but] deal[ing] generally with
matters
substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
relating to ... family relationships and child rearing.. . . In these

areas it has been held that there are limitations on the States' power
'77
to substantively regulate conduct.
The asserted fundamental right to develop a "sense of self,"
discussed above as being closely allied to the right of privacy, is also
viewed by adoptees as mandated by the fourteenth amendment.
Adoptees note that "'sense of self" has been rightly characterized as
a fourteenth amendment right by Justice Marshall concurring in
Castaneda v. Partida.7 8 Consequently, adoptees have asserted a
limitation upon state action infringing upon substantive rights
encompassed within the concept of "liberty" in the fourteenth
amendment. 79 Professor Cyril Means argues that if the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of "liberty" requires the voiding of a state
zoning ordinance, the effect of which was to forbid a grandmother
from living with one of her grandchildren,80 then, a fortiori, sealed

70. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), which articulates the compelling
interest test.
71. Reply Brief For Appellants at 26, ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
72. Id. at 26-27.
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. Id. at 163-64.
75. Reply Brief For Appellants at 21, ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
76. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
77. Id. at 713.
78. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss at 82, ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
79. Id. at 81.
80. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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record statutes should be voided when they forbid a grandchild to
know who his grandmother is.81 While representing a group of
adoptees seeking access to the records of their adoption proceedings,
he distinguished the constitutional rights of the adoptee, stemming
from a blood relationship to those whose identity he seeks, from the
purely contractual and statutory rights of foster parents.8 2 Birthparents would occupy the same status as adoptees, because they too
have rights stemming from a blood relationship, but they voluntarily divest themselves of such rights when they place the child for
adoption.8 3 The adoptee, although affected by the state-sanctioned
adoption process, is not a consensual party thereto and realistically
cannot be held to have relinquished any rights.84
B. Equal Protection Considerations
The equal protection argument is based upon the contention that
adoptees constitute a group of persons who are unconstitutionally
denied the right of access to their birth information solely because of
their status as adoptees. "They alone cannot inspect their original
birth certificates. '8 5 It is asserted that sealed record statutes bear no
substantial relation to the object of their legislation (i.e., the
promotion of the welfare of the adoptee) "because of the identity
crisis and psychological deprivation"8 6 they occasion in many
adoptees. Sealed record statutes induce an impermissible identity
deficiency. Furthermore, it is argued that laws employing a
classification based upon the status of being an adoptee (as do
sealed record statutes) should be subject to the same level of scrutiny
as laws employing classifications based upon the status of
illegitimacy, because the two classes are substantially identical. "A
classification based on one's status at birth, such as legitimate illegitimate or acknowledged illegitimate - unacknowledged illegitimate, is analogous to a classification based upon one's status as an
adoptee."8 7 Because illegitimacy is viewed as "similar to a suspect
criterion (an immutable characteristic determined soley by birth),"5 8it has been called a "quasi suspect" category requiring an

81. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants' Motions to

Dismiss at 106, ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
82. Id. at 87.
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the
Law, 10 FAM. L. Q. 185, 190 (1977).
86. Scheppers, Discovery Rights of the Adoptee - Privacy Rights of the Natural
Parent,A ConstitutionalDilemma, 4 U. SAN FERN, V. L. REV. 65, 71 (1975).

87. Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 145
(1973).
88. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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intermediate level of scrutiny. 89 The Supreme Court has defined the
level of scrutiny accorded a classification based upon illegitimacy as
''not a toothless one." Classifications based upon the status of
adoptee should be accorded the same level of scrutiny. 90
It may even be contended that sealed record statutes, because
they infringe upon a fundamental right - the right to develop a
"sense of self' - should be strictly scrutinized. Under such a level of
scrutiny statutes are struck down unless they promote a compelling
state interest. 91 It is claimed that sealed record statutes are not
necessary to promote such an interest. While access advocates
recognize that during an adoptee's minority there exists legitimate
state concern for birthparents (to protect anonymity in order to
facilitate adoption and avoid an adoption black market) and
adoptive parents (to permit them to nurture the adoptee into
adulthood without interference by birthparents), they nonetheless
maintain that the problems giving rise to such concerns actually did
not occur prior to the advent of the sealed record statutes, and thus
the state possesses no compelling interest. Nor is there any evidence
of such difficulties in open access jurisdictions. 92 As stated,
speculation that access will expand the black market is just that speculation - and there is no compelling proof that any such
increase would be more than minimal. 93 As to the birthparent's right
to privacy and the state's interest in supporting it, it should be
stressed that the evidence is mounting that many do not desire such
privacy and in fact sincerely desire to ascertain the identity of their
relinquished and now adult children. 94 While recognizing the
position of those birthparents who do want privacy, access
proponents argue that theirs is not the only position entitled to
consideration. They maintain that the demonstrated legitimacy of
their position must now be recognized.
C. Thirteenth Amendment Consideration
In ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon,95 a federal class action suit, it
was contended, inter alia, that the restrictive New York sealed
records statutes violate the thirteenth amendment in that they
impose one of the historic "badges and incidents" of African slavery

89. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants' Motions to

Dismiss at 101, ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-92 (1978)).

90. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
91. See note 70 supra.
92. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants'

Motions to

Dismiss at 117, ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

93. Id.
94. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
95. 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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upon the discrete, insular and politically powerless minority
comprised of the two percent of the adult population who are
adoptees. 96 One of the incidents of slavery was the practice of
abrogating the parental relationship and depriving the offspring of
African slaves of the care and attention of their parents. In the
Congressional debates over the thirteenth amendment, Senator
James Harlan of Iowa referred not only to minor children, but also
said, "I ask whence the origin of the (master's) title to the services of
the adult offspring of the slave mother. ' 97 The suit sought the
invalidation not of the adoption system, but only its sealed records
provisions regarding adult adoptees.
The crux of the thirteenth amendment argument is that when an
adult adoptee is prevented from obtaining vital knowledge because
other adults have the power to withhold their permission, he is
forced to relinquish a portion of the attributes of a free person at the
behest of others who rightfully should have no such power. The
process of relinquishment and adoption have made the child a
chattel property, to be conveyed first to the agency and then to the
adopting parents, not just in childhood but for the duration of life.
The adult human being who has been adopted is "reduced to a child
standing before Big Daddy, the judge. Please Daddy, give me my
98
name, Tell me who I am. Break the seal. Let me go free."
D.

Primacy of Adoptees' Interests

Further arguments are marshalled by open access proponents to
demonstrate that the adoptee's right to know more than offsets any
countervailing right of the other parties to the adoption process. It
has been pointed out that a birthparent's desire for anonymity may
not be premised upon an interest in one's reputation. 9 Also, the
state's interest in protecting birthparents' privacy does not rise to
constitutional dimensions, because they do not own information as
to birth identity exclusively, but rather as co-owners with the adult
adoptee. 10 The birthparents' privacy interest is further attentuated
by the fact that many of their number desire a reunion.10 '
Furthermore, as an alternative to sealed record statutes, those
birthparents who do not desire a reunion have the option to seek tort

96. Id. at 916.
97. Speech by Senator Harlan, CONG. GLOBE 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
98. B. LIFTON, TwicE BORN 238 (1975). See also Recognizing the Needs of Adopted
Persons: A Proposalto Amend the Illinois Adoption Act, 6 LoY. CHI. L.J. 49, 6061 (1975).
99. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (an interest in one's reputation stems
from state law and is not mandated by the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution).
100. Note, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1196, 1215 (1978).
101. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 supra.
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remedies by which they may be made whole for any tortious
invasion of their privacy by the adult adoptee. '10
Additionally, the interest of the adoptive parent in secrecy, while
strong during the minority of the adoptee, has decreased by the time
the adoptee reaches majority. The relationship between the members
of the adoptive family presumably has had sufficient time to achieve
occasioned by the
bonding adequate to withstand the 1stress
03
adoptee's reunion with his birthparents.
IV. COURTS' TREATMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Adoptees' increasingly strident claims of a right of access to the
records of their adoption proceedings, in concert with empirical
studies by health professionals documenting the importance of such
access for adoptees' psychological welfare, have resulted in court
challenges to sealed record statutes, most of which allege constitutional infirmities in the denial of access. Thus far, these constitutional challenges have been rebuffed.
In Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy,10 4 the Seventh Circuit
utilized the doctrine of abstention to avoid a decision on the merits of
a constitutional attack upon Illinois statutes limiting adoptees'
access to adoption records. Yet, in the rather sympathetically worded
opinion, the court referred approvingly to the unreported state nisi
prius decision, 0 5 which utilized a balancing approach. A "friend of
the court" notifies adoptive and birthparents who then may show by
a preponderance of the evidence that substantial harm would result
if disclosure is made; otherwise access is granted. The court reasoned
that the state statutes' 0 6 were construed by the lower court in such a
way that access was limited to cases where adoptees could show
critical medical reasons or genetic problems and in certain
circumstances if an adoptee had a "real and immediate" need to
know. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the state reviewing court had not
yet construed the non-access statutes, abstention was required
because such a construction might alter materially the constitutional
issue by further explicating the standards for unsealing.10 7 The court

102. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 697 (1976) (respondent whose reputation was
allegedly damaged by the circulation of a flyer containing pictures of "active

shoplifters" was free to bring an action for defamation in the state courts).
103. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
104. 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977).
105. Id. at 433 (citing In re Daniel Doe, 76 Co. 2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Co. Div., Co.
Dept., Nov. 22, 1977)).
106. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 4, §9.1-18 (1975); Id. ch. 1111/2, §§73-17(2)(a), 73-17(4).
107. Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1977). Cf. Ohio

Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977) and Bellotti v. Bair,
428 U.S. 132 (1976).
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termed the state court balancing process "persuasive,"' 10 8 however,
and approved by dictum such efforts to achieve an "equitable and
just solution."' 10 9
In ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon"0 various constitutional
arguments were dismissed without consideration of the merits of the
adult adoptees' claim. The court opined that the right to privacy and
the right to receive important information by adult adoptees was
permissibly limited in accordance with "a valid state interest to
balance conflicting rights of privacy and to protect the integrity of
the adoption process which is likely to suffer if the assurances of
secrecy are not present.""' The ALMA court held that a state has
more than a rational basis in controlling access - it has a
compelling interest. Thus even if the adult adoptees had made out a
case vis-a-vis access, the countervailing state interest would suffice
as regards constitutionality. Countervailance was found in the
expectation of confidentiality engendered in and statutory assurance
of privacy accorded to adoptive and birthparents. The court reasoned
that the sealed records statute was tempered by the "good cause"
provision. 112 The court did not specifically deal with the contention
that the good cause requirement was a badge or incident of
thirteenth amendment slavery except to note the defense's contention that the good cause requirement had never been recognized as
an incident of slavery and that the plaintiffs' slavery argument was
frivolous.
The ALMA decision has been described as a "negative
precedent" by James B. Boskey, Chairman of the American Bar
Association Family Law Section's Adoption Committee, who noted
1 3
the increasing attack upon the restrictive access laws and rules.
Professor Sanford N. Katz, Vice-chairman of the American Bar
Association Family Law Section, believes that the ALMA decision
(pending appeal at this writing) will create increased litigation
"from among the millions of ... adults ... who want to learn their
identities.""14
Several state decisions are more explicit than ALMA. In
Application of Maples, 1 5 the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected a
first amendment challenge by construing the free-flow-of-ideas cases
cited by the adoptees" 6 to proscribe the impermissible forbidding of
108. 569 F.2d at 435.
109. Id. at 434. Cf. In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 779 (1976)
(birthparents held to be necessary parties in an access case via a person in the
capacity of a guardian ad litem).
110. 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
111. Id. at 917.
112. Id. at 916.
113. The National Law Journal, Nov. 20, 1978 at 2, col. 3.
114. Id.
115. 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
116. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
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the free flow of ideas from one person to another, but not the mere
restriction of the flow of information which is the product of the
judicial process of adoption. The Maples court found such restrictions constitutional, holding that the state has a valid interest in
balancing conflicting rights of privacy and in protecting the
integrity of the adoption process, which the court felt would suffer if
confidentiality were diminished. 117 The plaintiffs liberty and
privacy were unavailing because there existed in adoptive and
birthparents a countervailing expectation of privacy, which, it was
observed, would be frustrated by allowing access." 8 As to equal
protection, the court found no invidious discrimination in the
constitutional sense. On the contrary, it reasoned that at birth the tobe-adopted child has a status no different from that of other children
in that the birthparents of all children have a legal duty to support
their children. Thus, the court rejected the argument that the status
of adoptees constitutes "suspect criteria."" 9 It further found no
invidious discrimination between adoptive and non-adoptive children, reasoning that the adoption process was beneficial to the
adoptee. 120
The pater familias approach of the Missouri court is roughly
parallel to that taken by a nisi prius New Jersey court in Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics.121 Mills is further important
because the ALMA decision states that its views would be recognized
as "almost in haec verba as the views expressed"' 22 in Mills. While
acknowledging the constitutional right to privacy of Griswold v.
Connecticut'2 ' and Roe v. Wade,

24

the Mills court held that only

personal rights deemed "fundamental" or "implicit" are included,
and that in order to be fundamental, the right asserted must be
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 25 Even in
areas of privacy in marriage and procreation, the right is not
absolute. 26 The Mills court found "heritage" information not to be
so intimately personal as to fall within the zones of privacy
implicitly protected in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights (viz.: the
first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments). 127 Asserting that the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978).
Id. at 763-64.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 765.
148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646, 650
(1977). See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
126. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (private homosexual
behavior punishable under state sodomy law).
127. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 309-10, 372 A.2d
646, 650 (1977).

514

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 8

right to privacy may be regulated if a state's interest is compelling,
and finding no fundamental interest of adoptees involved, the court
found the non-access statute reasonable as bearing a rational
relationship to a permissible state objective. The Mills court stressed
the right to privacy of the birthparents, construing Stanley v.
Georgia"18 differently than the adoptees, 129 and emphasized that no
constitutional or personal right was absolute. It found the good
cause requirement a valid mechanism to balance conflicting rights
and to protect the adoption process. 130 As to equal protection, the
Mills court did not find that the status of adoptees satisfied the
constitutional requirements for a suspect classification.
V. THE "GOOD CAUSE" REQUIREMENT
Judicial intransigence in the face of these constitutional
challenges does not entirely foreclose the adoptee from legal
recourse; rather, to gain access to the records an adoptee must make
a showing of such need as will satisfy statutory requirements. The
standard against which this need is measured, if not always clearly
3
articulated, frequently has been construed to be "good cause."' '
There is, however, a measure of unanimity that "bald curiosity"
alone is not so exigent a circumstance as to warrant unsealing the
records. 132 A review of several courts' holdings in actions by
adoptees seeking access to the records of their adoption proceedings
defines by way of illustration the showing courts require in order to
satisfy the "good cause" standard.
In In re Daniel Doe 33 an adult adoptee presented psychiatric
evidence to a Cook County judge that much of his emotional distress
and insecurity would be alleviated if his adoption records were
released. Although finding that the adoptee had made a prima facie
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he, as an adult,
had a real and immediate need for access to the adoption records, the
court also found that the adoptive and birthparents had an interest
and that due process required that they receive notice and
opportunity to be heard. Absent a showing by the adoptive or
birthparents that they would suffer substantial harm, the records
would, however, be released. The court also held that should the
search for the adoptive and birthparents prove unavailing, the relief
would be granted.

128. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
129. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 311-14, 372 A.2d
646, 652 (1977).
130. Id.
131. See text accompanying note 8 supra.

132. In re Anonymous, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2105 (N.Y. Surr. Ct., Queens Co., Nov.
25, 1977).
133. 76 Co. 2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Co. Div., Co. Dept., Nov. 22, 1977).
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3 1 the same court required, as a
In In re Maxtone-Graham,1
condition precedent to ruling upon the request of the petitioner that
the identity of her birthmother be revealed, that the birthmother be
located, and that an effort be made to secure her consent. Her
consent was in fact given and the files were unsealed. The names of
foster parents who had cared for the adoptee prior to adoption,
however, were withheld. The court held further that the foster
parents' need for confidentiality outweighed the adoptee's needs
because
they had had no contact with the adoptee for over 30
135
years.

In Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics,136 the court

weighed the interest of the adoptee against that of the birthparents
and held that because the adoptee's interest was based
upon more
37
than mere curiosity, the records should be unsealed.'
A Missouri appellate court similarly employed an approach
"weighing" the respective interests of the parties to the adoption
process. 38 It required the adoptee to show cause, and if the showing
was sufficient, so much information as was adjudged necessary
would be disclosed. Information as to the identity and whereabouts
of the parties to the triangle would be released only under compelling
circumstances, however, and the judge sought to obtain the parties'
consent if possible. The court held that "great deference" should be
given to the interests of the other parties
to the adoption triangle
39
should their consent not be obtained.
In Washington, D.C., an appellate court remanded an access
case because the trial court, without a hearing, had denied a petition
for leave to inspect adoption records. The appellate court noted that
"it is a matter of common knowledge that due to studies and
experiences in the recent decade there is an increasing well of
support for opening court files to adoptees so as to aid in their
searches for their natural parents."' 14 The case was remanded for an
evidentiary hearing. On remand, the lower court permitted access
after the hearing'l4 "based solely on the merits of this particular
request."' 42 The court noted the "petitioner's needs and her ability to
cope with the ramification of disclosure, supplemented by the
affirmative, tender and supportive positions of her husband and
adoptive parents."' 43

134. 90 Misc. 2d 107, 393 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1975).
135. Id. at 110, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
136. 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
137. Id. at 318-20, 372 A.2d at 655.
138. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
139. Id. at 766.
140. In re Adoption of Female Infant, No. A 449-59 (Sup. Ct. D.C., Jan. 31, 1979).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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CONCLUSION

In light of the growing body of evidence that deprivation of
origin information promotes severe psychological dysfunction
among adoptees, should not sealed record statutes accordingly be
modified to reflect the needs of those whose welfare is purportedly
the primary concern of the adoption process? Several recommendations regarding such modification, while ameliorating the adoptee's
plight, also protect the interests of the other parties to the adoption
process. First, if the records of the adoption proceedings are made
available to the adoptee as of right only upon his reaching majority,
sufficient time will be allowed for the bond between adoptee and
adoptive parents to be reinforced sufficiently to withstand a threat of
the alienation of the affections of the adoptee occasioned by a
reconciliation with the birthparents. Such an approach is consonant
with the view expressed by Dr. A. D. Sorosky, a well-known
psychiatrist in the field of adoption, that "it is important for the
adoptive parents to realize that they are the true psychological
parents. The birthparent is someone else - a link to the past in
terms of that person's identity. It is identity the adoptee seeks, not
another set of parents.' 1 44 This approach also coincides with the
opinion of Dr. James Harris, Interim Director of the Children's
Medical and Surgical Center (Division of Psychiatry) at The Johns
Hopkins Hospital, that it is "advisable that adult adoptees be given
the right to see records of their biological origin."' 145
Second, if such a modified statute granting access only upon
maturity were to apply only prospectively, birthparents who placed
their child for adoption with the expectation of anonymity would not
have that expectation frustrated. Subsequent to the modification of
the statute, parents considering placing their child for adoption
would be forewarned of the child's legal right to learn their identity
upon reaching maturity. An infirmity in the prospective approach
lies in the fact that it grants adoptees differing rights depending
upon the fortuitous factor of date of adoption. Those "placed" before
the modification would have rights inferior to those placed
subsequently. Such a system of classification might run afoul of the
equal protection clause of the federal constitution.
Creation of a mediation board, to function either in place of a
modification of the statute or in addition thereto, is an alternative
proposed in certain quarters. Composed of persons professionally
trained in the field of adoption, such a board would, if it considered
such action appropriate, provide assistance and counseling in
effecting a reunion after contacting the interested parties. The
144. Lilliston, Social Workers Discuss Adoptee's Plight, L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1974,
Sec. 4 (View) at 13, col. 2 (quoting Dr. Sorosky).
145. Letter to the author from Dr. Harris, dated July 10, 1978.
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primary consideration in making a determination as to the
appropriateness of a reunion under this approach would be whether
the other parties to the triad would accede to it. Adoptees view the
concept of a mediation board with disfavor, contending that they
have an unconditional
right to posses origin information upon
146
reaching majority.

As it now stands, the adoption process disproportionately
burdens the adult adoptee. The law's purpose in secreting adoption
records is said to be the protection of the birthmother, the adoptee
and the adoptive parents from unwanted confrontation. Has not this
paternalism, however, produced an unforeseen and unwarranted
result? Although it might be traumatic for the birthmother to be
confronted by her now-grown child, should solicitude for her feelings
preempt the rights of that adult human being who seeks to know his
nascence? Similarly, the desire of the adoptive parents to avoid the
possibility that after the reunion the birthparents might compete for
the affection of their adult child should not operate inexorably to
frustrate the identity search of the grown-up. Dr. Henry Kempe, a
preeminent authority in child abuse, observed: "In a free society the
newborn child does not belong to the state nor to his parents, but to
himself in care of his parents.

' 147

Even more surely, the mature

adoptee belongs to himself, and he should not be deprived of that
most integral component of his selfhood - his identity.
Adoption is a worthwhile and necessary societal mechanism.
Yet, let us not lose sight of the fact that it is a human mechanism one operated by humans who find themselves occupying the role of
social worker, legislator, and judge. The beneficent purpose of
adoption must not obscure the fact that as practiced it has produced
inequities. Such imbalance was not foreseen originally by the
experts in the adoption movement. They assumed that the transposition of the adoptive in place of the original birth certificate was
equivalent to supplanting the birthparents entirely by the adoptive
parents. This laudable theory was then extended to obliterate
completely all legal vestiges of the adoptee's true life source. The
paradox is that this theory creates an injustice for the professed
primary beneficiaries of the adoption process.

146. A relatively new and specialized technique, utilizing an adult adoptee rather
than a social worker as an intermediary to approach birthparents with their
offspring's request for a reunion, is tolerated by some adoptees, because they feel
that social workers might present such a request in such an unsympathetic or
casual way as to chill what would otherwise be an altogether manageable
joinder. It should be observed, however, that most adult adoptees view the
intermediary approach as at best an inequitable compromise, as they feel their
fundamental rights are being denied when any barrier is erected between them
and the information they seek.
147. Kempe, Approaches to Preventing Child Abuse - The Health Visitors Concept,
130 AM. J. DISEASES OF THE CHILD 941, 947 (1976). Permission to use this
quotation granted by the author.
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Society, therefore, must seek to adjust the adoption device so as
to ameloriate this unforeseen bout undeniable injustice. This will be
an enormously difficult task, requiring immense thoughfulness and
understanding in view of the primal emotionalism of the subject
matter. Each party to the trialogue is entitled to be heard, and anger
should not be directed against those who voice legitimate complaint.
The participants in the adoption process are linked inextricably into
a triangle. Why should this triangle not be equilateral - and not
isosceles, scalene or obtuse? Particularly .

.

. obtuse.

